Security of network applications

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Standard situation
- authentication and authorisation based on username and password
  - problem: password snooping
- authentication based on IP address (server web; R commands = rsh, rlogin, rcp, ...)
  - problem: IP spoofing
- general problems:
  - data snooping / forging
  - shadow server / MITM

Channel security
- authentication (single or mutual), integrity and privacy only during the transit inside the communication channel
- no possibility of non repudiation
- requires no (or small) modification of applications

Message / data security
- authentication (single), integrity and privacy self-contained in the message
- possibility of non repudiation
- requires modification of applications

Security internal to the applications
- each application implements security internally
- the common part is limited to the communication channels (socket)
- possible implementation errors (inventing security protocols is not simple!)
- does not guarantee interoperability

Security external to applications
- the session level would be the ideal one to be used to implement many security functions
  - ... but it does not exist in TCP/IP!
  - a "secure session" level was proposed:
    - it simplifies the work of application developers
    - it avoids implementation errors
    - it is up to the application to select it (or not)
Secure channel protocols

- **SSL / TLS**
  - the most widely used!

- **SSH**
  - it was a successful product (especially in the period when export of USA crypto products was restricted), but today it is a niche product

- **PCT**
  - proposed by MS as an alternative to SSL
  - one of the few fiascos of MS!

SSL (Secure Socket Layer)

- proposed by Netscape Communications
- **secure transport channel (session level):**
  - peer authentication (server, server+client)
  - message confidentiality
  - message authentication and integrity
  - protection against replay and filtering attacks
- easily applicable to all protocols based on TCP:
  - HTTP, SMTP, NNTP, FTP, TELNET, ...
  - e.g. the famous secure HTTP (https://... ) = 443/TCP

Official ports for SSL applications

- **nsiops** 261/tcp # IIOP Name Service over TLS/SSL
- **https** 443/tcp # http protocol over TLS/SSL
- **smtps** 465/tcp # smtp protocol over TLS/SSL (was ssmtp)
- **ntmps** 563/tcp # mntp protocol over TLS/SSL (was sntmp)
- **imap4-ssl** 585/tcp # IMAP4+SSL (use 993 instead)
- **ssh** 614/tcp # SSL/SSH
- **ldaps** 638/tcp # ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sidap)
- **ftps-data** 989/tcp # ftp protocol, data, over TLS/SSL
- **ftps** 990/tcp # ftp protocol, control, over TLS/SSL
- **telnets** 992/tcp # telnet protocol over TLS/SSL
- **imaps** 993/tcp # imap4 protocol over TLS/SSL
- **ircs** 994/tcp # irc protocol over TLS/SSL
- **pop3s** 995/tcp # pop3 protocol over TLS/SSL (was spop3)
- **msft-gc-ssl** 3269/tcp # MS Global Catalog with LDAP/SSL

SSL – authentication and integrity

- **peer authentication at channel setup:**
  - the server authenticates itself by sending its public key (X.509 certificate) and by responding to an asymmetric challenge
  - the client authentication (with public key and X.509 certificate) is optional

- **for authentication and integrity of the data exchanged over the channel the protocol uses:**
  - a keyed digest (MD5 or SHA-1)
  - an MID to avoid replay and cancellation

SSL - confidentiality

- the client generates a session key used for symmetric encryption of data (RC2, RC4, DES, 3DES or IDEA)
- the key is sent to the server after having encrypted it with the public key of the server (RSA, Diffie-Hellman or Fortezza-KEA)
SSL-3 architecture

SSL-handshake protocol
SSL-change cipher spec protocol
SSL-alert protocol
application protocol (e.g. HTTP)
SSL record protocol
reliable transport protocol (e.g. TCP)
network protocol (e.g. IP)

Session-id

In order to avoid re-negotiation of the cryptographic parameters for each SSL connection, the SSL server can send a session identifier (that is, more connections can be part of the same logical session).

If the client, when opening the SSL connection, sends a valid session-id then the negotiation part is skipped and data are immediately exchanged over the secure channel.

The server can reject the use of session-id (always or after a time passed after its issuance).

SSL with session-ID

Typical web transaction:
- 1. open, 2. GET page.htm, 3. page.htm, 4. close
- 1. open, 2. GET home.gif, 3. home.gif, 4. close
- 1. open, 2. GET logo.gif, 3. logo.gif, 4. close
- 1. open, 2. GET back.jpg, 3. back.jpg, 4. close
- 1. open, 2. GET music.mid, 3. music.mid, 4. close

If the SSL cryptographic parameters must be negotiated every time, then the computational load becomes high.

SSL-3 record protocol

- Compression
- Fragmentation
- Computation of MAC
- Padding
- Encryption
- Header

application data
F1 F2

TLS-1.0 record format

- uint8 type = change_cipher_spec (20), alert (21), handshake (22), application_data (23)
- uint16 version = major (uint8) + minor (uint8)
- uint16 length:
  - <= 2**14 (record not compressed) for compatibility with SSL-2
  - <= 2**14 + 1024 (compressed records)
SSL – computation of MAC

MAC = message_digest (key, seq_number || type || version || length || fragment)

- message_digest
  - depends on the chosen algorithm
- key
  - sender-write-key or receiver-read-key
- seq_number
  - 32-bit integer

SSL-3: new features with respect to SSL-2

- data compression:
  - optional
  - before encryption (after it’s not useful anymore …)
- data encryption is optional:
  - in order to have only authentication and integrity
- possibility to re-negotiate the SSL connection:
  - periodical change of keys
  - change of the algorithms

SSL-3 handshake protocol

- agree on a set of algorithms for confidentiality and integrity
- exchange random numbers between the client and the server to be used for the subsequent generation of the keys
- establish a symmetric key by means of public key operations (RSA, DH or Fortezza)
- negotiate the session-id
- exchange the necessary certificates

Confidentiality of data

Relationship among keys and sessions

- one-time keys generated on the fly:
  - to provide authentication they must be signed (e.g. an X.509 certificate must be available)
  - DH suitable, RSA slow
  - compromise for RSA = re-use N times
- perfect forward secrecy:
  - who knows the private key can decrypt all the SSL sessions
  - with ephemeral mechanisms the server’s private key is used only for signing
Client hello
- SSL version preferred by the client
- 28 bytes generated in a pseudo-random manner
- a session identifier (session-id)
  - 0 to start a new session
  - different from 0 to ask to resume a previous session
- list of "cipher suite" (=alg of encryption + key exchange + integrity) supported by the client
- list of compression methods supported by the client

Server hello
- SSL version chosen by the server
- 28 bytes generated in a pseudo-random manner
- a session identifier (session-id)
  - new session-id if session-id=0 in the client-hello or reject the session-id proposed by the client
  - session-id proposed by the client if the server accepts to resume the session
- "cipher suite" chosen by the server
  - should be the strongest one in common with the client
- compression method chosen by the server

Cipher suite
- key exchange algorithm
- symmetric encryption algorithm
- hash algorithm (for MAC)
- examples:
  - SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
  - SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
  - SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
  - SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

Certificate (server)
- certificate for server authentication
  - the subject / subjectAltName must be the same as the identity of the server (DNS name, IP address, ...)
- can be used only for signing or (in addition) also for encryption
  - described in the field keyUsage
  - if it is only for signing then it is required also the phase for server-key exchange
Certificate request
- used for client authentication
- specifies also the list of CAs considered trusted by the server
  - the browsers show to the users (for a connection) only the certificates issued by trusted CAs

Server key exchange
- carries the server public key for encryption
- needed only in the following cases:
  - the RSA server certificate can be used only for signature
  - anonymous or ephemeral DH is used to establish the master-secret
  - there are export problems that force the use of ephemeral RSA/DH keys
  - Fortezza
- important: this is the only message explicitly signed by the server

Certificate (client)
- carries the certificate for client authentication
- the certificate must have been issued from one CA in the trusted CA list in the Certificate Request message

Client key exchange
- the client generates symmetric keys and send them to the server
- various ways
  - pre-master secret encrypted with the server RSA public key (ephemeral or from its X.509 certificate)
  - public part of DH
  - Fortezza

Certificate verify
- explicit test signature done by the client
- hash computed over all the handshake messages before this one and encrypted with the client private key

Change cipher spec
- trigger the change of the algorithms to be used for message protection
- allows to pass from the previous unprotected messages to the protection of the next messages with algorithms and keys just negotiated
- theoretically is a protocol on its own and not part of the handshake
- some analysis suggest that it could be eliminated
Finished

- first message protected with the negotiated algorithms
- very important to authenticate the whole handshake sequence:
  - contains a MAC computed over all the previous handshake messages (but change cipher spec) using as a key the master secret
  - useful to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks of the rollback type
  - different for client and server

TLS

- Transport Layer Security
- standard IETF:
  - TLS-1.0 = RFC-2246 (jan 1999)
  - TLS-1.1 = RFC-4346 (apr 2006)
  - TLS-1.0 = SSL-3.1 (99% coincident with SSL-3)
  - emphasis on standard (i.e. not proprietary) digest and asymmetric crypto algorithms; mandatory:
    - DH + DSA + 3DES
    - HMAC
    - ... that is the ciphersuite
    - TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

TLS-1.1

- RFC-4346
- the implicit IV is replaced with an explicit IV to protect against CBC attacks
- handling of padding errors is changed to use the bad_record_mac rather than the decryption_failed alert to protect against CBC attacks
- IANA registries defined for protocol parameters
- premature closes no longer cause a session to be nonresumable
- additional notes added for various new attacks

TLS evolution

- ciphersuites:
  - (RFC-2712) Kerberos ciphersuites for TLS
  - (RFC-3268) AES ciphersuites for TLS
  - (RFC-4492) ECC cipher suites for TLS
  - (RFC-4132) Camellia ciphersuites for TLS
  - (RFC-4279) pre-shared key ciphersuites for TLS
- compression:
  - (RFC-3749) TLS compression methods
  - (RFC-3943) TLS protocol compression using LZS
- other:
  - (RFC-4366) TLS extensions

DTLS

- Datagram Transport Layer Security (RFC-4347)
- applies the TLS concepts to datagram security (e.g. UDP)
- doesn’t offer the same properties as TLS
- competition with IPsec and application security
- example – SIP security:
  - with IPsec
  - with TLS (only for SIP_over_TCP)
  - with DTLS (only for SIP_over_UDP)
  - with secure SIP

HTTP security

- security mechanisms defined in HTTP/1.0:
  - "address-based" = the server performs access control based on the IP address of the client
  - "password-based" (or Basic Authentication Scheme) = access control based on username and password, Base64 encoded
- both schemas are highly insecure (because HTTP assumes a secure channel!)
- HTTP/1.1 introduces “digest authentication” based on a symmetric challenge
- RFC-2617 “HTTP authentication: basic and digest access authentication”
HTTP - basic authentication scheme

GET /path/to/protected/page
HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized - authentication failed
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="RealmName"
Authorization: Basic 864_encoded_username_password

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: NCSA/1.3
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/html
<HTML> protected page ... </HTML>

HTTP and SSL/TLS

- two approaches:
  - "TLS then HTTP" (RFC-2818 – HTTP over TLS)
  - "HTTP then TLS" (RFC-2817 – upgrading to TLS within HTTP/1.1)
- note: “SSL then HTTP” is in widespread use but it is undocumented
- the two approaches are not equivalent and have an impact over applications, firewall and IDS
- concepts generally applicable to all protocols:
  - “SSL/TLS then proto” vs. “proto then TLS”

WWW security

- SSL channel:
  - protection of the transactions
  - protection of the application passwords
- password (for Basic/Digest Authentication):
  - of the HTTP service
  - of the OS hosting the server (e.g. XP or UNIX)
- ACL for document access control:
  - depending on the authentication performed (OS users, X.509 DN)

SSL client authentication at the application level

- via client authentication it’s possible to identify the user that opened the channel (without asking for his username and password)
- some web servers support a (semi-)automatic mapping between the credentials extracted from the X.509 certificate and the users of the web server and/or the OS

Authentication in web applications

- the earlier the access control, the smaller the attack surface
- no need to repeat the authentication (the id may be propagated)

What about forms requesting user/pwd?

- the actual security depends on the URI of the method used to send username and password to the server
- technically speaking, it’s not important the security of the page containing the form
- psychologically, it is very important the security of the page containing the form because few users have the technical knowledge to verify the URI of the HTTP method used to send user/pwd
S-HTTP
- new version of the HTTP-1.0 protocol developed by EIT-Terisa
- HTTP queries and replies are encapsulated inside a secure envelope (PEM, PGP or PKCS-7)
- key negotiation: in-line, OOB or Kerberos
- certificates: X.509 o PKCS-6
- digital signature: RSA o DSA
- digest: MD2, MD5 o SHA-1
- encryption: DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4
- RFC-2660 “The Secure HTTP”
- RFC-2659 “Security extensions for HTML”

Coexistence of SSL with other protocols

The X-windows system (X11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVER (screen, keyboard, mouse)</th>
<th>CLIENT (CPU, RAM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAX/VMS</td>
<td>VAX/VMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPARC/Solaris</td>
<td>SPARC/Solaris</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Security of X-windows
- authentication:
  - IP address (xhost +host)
  - cookie (since X11R4)
  - Kerberos V5 (since X11R6)
- weak authentication implies that by using X11 primitives (e.g. xwindump) we may capture the whole I/O of the graphic terminal without any need for sniffing
- X11 forwarding over secure channel:
  - SSH
  - IPsec

Security of remote DBMS access
- protection heavily depends on the access type (note that there is not a thing such as “network SQL”):
  - terminal emulation = channel protection (SSL-telnet, SSH, ...)
  - web-based DBMS front-end = web protection (SSL, ...)
  - client-server query environment = proprietary security solution, or IPsec for protecting the transactions

E-payment systems
- failure of the digital cash, for technical and political problems (e.g. the DigiCash failure)
- currently the most widely used approach is transmitting a credit card number over a SSL channel ...
- ... but this is no guarantee against fraud: VISA Europe declares that Internet transactions generate about 50% of the fraud attempts, although they are just 2% of its total transaction amount!
Security of network applications

Security of the credit card transactions

- STT
  (Secure Transaction Technology)
  VISA + Microsoft
- SEPP
  (Secure Electronic Payment Protocol)
  Mastercard, IBM, Netscape, GTE, CyberCash
- SET = STT + SEPP
  (Secure Electronic Transaction)

SET

- SET is not a payment system but a set of protocols to use inside an open untrusted network the existing infrastructure for credit card payments
- uses X.509v3 certificates dedicated only to SET transactions
- protects the user privacy because it shows to each part only the relevant and pertinent data

Features of SET

- version 1.0 (may 1997)
- digest: SHA-1
- symmetric encryption: DES
- key exchange: RSA
- digital signature: RSA con SHA-1
- www.setco.org (doesn’t exist any more)

SET architecture

SET actors (I)

- cardholder
  proper owner of a SET-enabled credit card
- merchant
  seller of a product via Internet (Web or e-mail)
- issuer
  financial institute that issued the credit card of the user

SET actors (II)

- acquirer
  financial institute that has a relation with the merchant and interfaces it with one or more payment networks
- payment gateway
  system that translates the SET transactions to the format accepted by the payment network of the acquirer
- certification authority
  creates X.509v3 certificates and CRL for all the SET actors
SET double signature
- to protect the user privacy towards the merchant and the financial entities (acquirer + issuer) SET uses a double signature
- the merchant has no information about the payment details
- the financial entities have no information about the goods
- only the user can prove the association between the goods and the payment

SET double signature: details
- PI: Purchase Information (payment)
- OI: Order Information (goods)
- \[ DS = E \left( H(H(PI), H(OI)), Ukpri \right) \]
- \[ DS + H(PI) \] to the merchant
  - the merchant knows OI and thus can compute \( H(H(PI), H(OI)) \) verifying that it matches the value extracted from the signature
- \[ DS + H(OI) \] to the acquirer
  - the acquirer knows PI and thus can compute \( H(H(PI), H(OI)) \) verifying that it matches the value extracted from the signature

Problems of SET
- software very expensive (for the CA, the merchant and the acquirer)
- a special client-side application is needed (the SET wallet)
- complex procedure to issue the public-key certificates for the user
- a version 2.0 of SET was planned to get rid of the wallet (should have used the browser for user interface)

A web-based payment architecture

Web-based payment architecture
- baseline:
  - the buyer owns a credit card
  - the buyer has a SSL-enabled browser
- consequences:
  - the effective security depends upon the configuration of both the server and the client
  - the payment gateway has all the information (payment + goods) while merchant knows only info about the goods

PCI DSS
- Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
- required by all credit card issuers for Internet-based transactions
- much more detailed technical prescriptions compared to other security standards (e.g. HIPAA = Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)
- https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCI DSS prescriptions (I)</th>
<th>PCI DSS prescriptions (II)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>design, build and operate a protected network:</strong>&lt;br&gt;  - R1 = install and maintain a configuration with firewall to protect access to the cardholders’ data&lt;br&gt;  - R2 = don’t use pre-defined system passwords or other security parameters set by the manufacturer</td>
<td><strong>establish and follow a program for vulnerability management</strong>&lt;br&gt;  - R5 = use an antivirus and regularly update it&lt;br&gt;  - R6 = develop and maintain protected applications and systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>protect the cardholders’ data:</strong>&lt;br&gt;  - R3 = protect the stored cardholders’ data&lt;br&gt;  - R4 = encrypt the cardholders’ data when transmitted across an open public network</td>
<td><strong>regularly monitor and test the networks</strong>&lt;br&gt;  - R10 = monitor and track all accesses to network resources and cardholders’ data&lt;br&gt;  - R11 = periodically test the protection systems and procedures</td>
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